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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
stances surrounding the prior contract to sell machinery, there
seems to have been a collateral unwritten agreement to let the
plaintiff retain the machinery not specifically mentioned in the
contract to sell, transferring the remaining machinery with the
property. If this was not their understanding the prior contract
to sell the machinery would have been unnecessary, since all of
the machinery would have been transferred by the notarial act
of sale. 14 Further, the very fact that the prior contract was
formed shows that the parties did not intend to integrate their
complete agreement in the notarial act of sale.
The parties apparently intended that their agreement be
contained both in the notarial act and in the prior contract to
sell the machinery, which was collateral to the notarial act, and
which gave rise to the unwritten agreement alleged by the plain-
tiff. It is submitted, therefore, that the parol evidence should
have been admitted to determine if these were their actual inten-
tions. If they did intend to integrate their agreements, parol
evidence should not be allowed to vary the terms of the written
act; if they did not so intend, effect should have been given to
the collateral agreements revealed by the parol evidence.
William J. Doran, Jr.
INSURANcE-AcTION AGAINST LIABILITY INSURER BY NAmED INSURED
Plaintiff brought suit against his liability insurance carrier
for damages resulting from injuries he suffered when his car, in
which he was a passenger, was involved in an accident while his
wife was driving. Circumstances of the accident clearly estab-
lished the negligence of the wife. Held, the provisions of the
policy authorized, recovery by the named insured against his
insurer. McDowell v. National Surety Corp., 68 So.2d 189 (La.
App. 1953).
The courts have previously held that under the Louisiana
Direct Action Statute' only general defenses of the insured can
be urged by the insurer. Thus, a party can recover from a spouse's
liability insurer even though the defense of coverture, a personal
14. Art. 468, LA. CVL CODE of 1870.
1. LA. R.S. § 22:655 (1950). For a general discussion of this statute, see
Comment, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 495 (1953).
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defense, would prevent a successful action from being brought
against the negligent spouse.2
The wife was unquestionably the "insured" when the acci-
dent occurred. Under the omnibus clause of the plaintiff's lia-
bility insurance policy, the "insured" was defined as: ". . . the
named insured and also . . .any person while using the auto-
mobile and any person or organization legally responsible for
the use thereof, provided the actual use of the automobile is by
the named insured or with his permission."3
The sole question before the court was whether the terms
of the policy manifested an intention that the carrier's liability
through an additional insured included liability even to the
named insured. Under the coverage clause the insurer agreed "to
pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall be-
come legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily in-
jury, sickness or disease, including death at any time resulting
therefrom, sustained by any person, caused by accident and aris-
ing out of ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile. ' 4 No-
where in the policy was the term "any person" limited to suggest
that the named insured did not come within the coverage of the
policy. The court came to the same conclusion, using the follow-
ing language: "Certainly had the insurer desired to relieve itself
of liability for personal injuries to the named insured, it could
have easily done so by inserting appropriate language to that
effect into the policy."5
The policy in question was made to conform to the National
Standard Basic Automobile Liability Policy, 6 which reflects, in
its recent changes, a definite intention on the part of the insurers'
organization to extend coverage to the named insured. On the
basis of the wording of the standard policy in force prior to 1936,
2. Edwards v. Royal Indemnity Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191 (1935); Scar-
borough v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 11 So.2d 52 (La. App. 1942).
Harvey v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 6 So.2d 774 (La. App. 1942), where
the court held that the insurer, by agreeing "To pay on behalf of the insured
all sums which the insured shall become obligated to pay by reason of the
liability imposed upon him by law for damages" (id. at 775) had shown an
intent to pay not only enforceable claims against the insured, but also claims
for which a cause of action existed, but which could not be enforced because
no right of action existed.
3. McDowell v. National Surety Corp., 68 So.2d 189, 195 (La. App. 1953).
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Standard Basic Automobile Liability Policies as approved by the
Casualty and Surety Division of the Louisiana Insurance Rating Commission,
and the Insurance Department of the Office of the Secretary of State (1947
policy).
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recovery by the named insured had been permitted.7 In that year,
the national standard policy was revised so that the named
insured was explicitly barred from bringing such a suit.8 How-
ever, in 1947 the standard policy was again revised,9 and the
clauses which had barred action by the named insured were
omitted. There is no indication in the text of the opinion that
this history was before the court when it reached its decision.
Although the insurer in this suit may have had no knowl-
edge of this history, he is required by Louisiana law to extend
the full coverage of the standard policy.' 0 Since these changes
indicate a definite intention that the standard policy permit
recovery by the named insured, the decision, though based exclu-
sively on the wording of the policy, is manifestly correct.
Robert J. Jones
LOUISIANA PRACTICE-EFFECT OF APPLICATION FOR SUPERVISORY
WRITS ON TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
Defendant's exception of lis pendens was overruled by the
trial court. Defendant then notified the trial judge that she
intended to apply to the Supreme Court for a review of the
ruling under its supervisory jurisdiction. Subsequently, default
judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant's
motion to vacate the judgment was denied and she made appli-
7. Farmer v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 11 F. Supp. 542
(M.D. Ala. 1935); Howe v. Howe, 87 N.H. 338, 179 Atl. 362 (1935); Archer v.
General Casualty Co. of Wisconsin, 219 Wis. 100, 261 N.W. 9 (1935).
8. 1 INSURANCE POLICY ANNOTATIONS, SECTION OF INSURANCE LAW OF AMERI-
CAN BAR ASSOCIATION 29 (Supp. 1945):
"(b) INJURY TO OR DEATH OF .... NAMED INSURED
"The insurance with respect to any person or organization other than the
named insured does not apply: (a) to Injury to or death of any person who
is a named insured."
APPLEMAN, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE 106 (1938):
"DEFINITION OF INSURED
"The unqualified word 'Insured' wherever used . . . Includes not only
the named insured but also any person while using the automobile and
any person or organization legally responsible for the use thereof, provided
that the declared and actual use of the automobile Is 'pleasure and business'
or 'commercial,' each as defined herein, and provided further that the actual
use is with the permission of the named Insured. The provisions of this
paragraph do not apply:
"(b) to any person or organization with respect to bodily Injury to or
death of any person who is a named insured."
9. Note 6 supra.
10. LA. R.S. § 22:623 (1950).
